Volume 20
Issue 1 Winter 1990
Winter 1990

Civil Rights: Affirmative Action Gender-Based Criteria Consistent
with Title VII: Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, California
Sophia S. Collaros

Recommended Citation
Sophia S. Collaros, Civil Rights: Affirmative Action Gender-Based Criteria Consistent with Title VII:
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 219 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol20/iss1/11

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

CIVIL RIGHTS: Affirmative Action Gender-Based Criteria
Consistent with Title VII: Johnson v. TransportationAgency,
Santa Clara County, California

I. INTRODUCTION
In Johnson v. TransportationAgency, Santa Clara County, California,' the United States Supreme Court held that a public employer's decision to promote a female applicant pursuant to a voluntary
affirmative action plan was fully consistent with Title VII's purpose
of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace2 and
that Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts.' The Court
addressed the question of whether, in promoting a female applicant

over a male, a public employer's use of gender as a positive criterion
in making hiring decisions was permissible under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq.4 Guided

1. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court in which
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined, with Justice Stevens writing a
concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.

Dissenting were Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and White.
2. Id. at 630.
3. Id. This case neither raised nor addressed a constitutional claim below. The Supreme
Court notes that its decision rests only on the issue of the prohibitory scope of Title VII.
However, where a party advances a constitutional claim, the Court states that employers
must "justify the implementation of a voluntary affirmative action program under the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 620 n.2 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986)).
The Court does not regard as identical the constraints of Title VII and the Constitution
on voluntarily adopted affirmative action programs. Id. at 632. Furthermore, the Court notes
that although a public employer must satisfy the Constitution, this does not negate the fact
that the statutory prohibition (Title VII) with which the employer must contend was not
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution. Id. at 627 n.6.
This Note, therefore, does not address any constitutional claims. For an equal protection
analysis of the Johnson decision, see Justice O'Connor's concurrence, id. at 647. See also
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), which holds that public employers
must justify under the equal protection clause adoption and implementation of a voluntary
affirmative action plan.
4. Section 703(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, 42 U.S.C. sec.
2000e-2(a) provides that it
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(Emphasis added.)
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by their 1981 decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,5
the United States Supreme Court tested the legality of the affirmative
action plan in Johnson and held that Johnson's employer appropriately took gender
into account as one factor in determining
6
promotion criteria.
This Note examines Johnson7 in light of the United States Supreme
Court's evolving interpretation of antidiscrimination law. Since the
Johnson decision does not establish permissible outer limits of voluntary employer programs,' in that the Court does not enunciate a
specific standard for purposes of voluntary affirmative action plans
under Title VII, this Note traces the Court's path and analysis in
Johnson by first discussing the Court's past application of Congressional intent with respect to affirmative action plans under Title
VII and the influence of past Court Title VII interpretations on the
Johnson case. Finally, review of the majority's decision in Johnson
will demonstrate the extent of the Court's willingness to find a public
employer's consideration of gender as a valid factor to weigh in a
voluntary affirmative action plan subject to the constraints of Title
VII.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District Board
of Supervisors (County) approved an affirmative action plan (Plan)
for the County Transportation Agency (Agency). 9 The County implemented an affirmative action plan because mere prohibition of
discriminatory practices was insufficient to remedy effects of past
practices. 0 In addition, the Plan would help achieve an equitable
representation of minorities, women, and handicapped persons."
Before adopting the Plan, the Agency reviewed its work force and
found that women were underrepresented in comparison to the county
labor force, in both the Agency as a whole and in five of seven

5. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Court in a 5-2 decision upheld a collective bargaining
agreement which set aside 5006 of the positions in a new crafts training program until there
existed an equal correlation between the percentage of blacks employed as skilled workers
and the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that Title VII did not prohibit raceconscious affirmative action plans.
6. 480 U.S. at 641-42.
7. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
8. Id. at 642. See Justice Stevens' concurrence wherein he emphasizes that the opinion
does not establish limits of voluntary programs undertaken by employers in order to benefit
disadvantaged groups. Id.
9. Id. at 620.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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job categories.' 2 The Agency attributed this underrepresentation of
women in part to the fact that women were not traditionally employed
in positions such as Agency officials, professionals, or skilled craft
workers.'" In addition, the Agency determined that women were not
strongly motivated to seek training or employment in those areas
because of14 limited opportunities in the past to work in such classifications.
As a remedy, the Agency Plan provided that in making promotions
to traditionally segregated job classifications in which women had
been significantly underrepresented, the Agency had the authority
to consider, as one factor, the sex or ethnicity of a qualified applicant." However, the Agency Plan set aside no specific number
of positions for minorities or women. 16 Instead, as a benchmark by
which to evaluate progress, the Agency's stated long-term goal was
to attain a work force whose composition reflected the
proportion
17
of minorities and wormen in the county labor force.
One year after adoption of the Plan, the Agency announced a
vacancy for road dispatcher,' 8 a job classified as a Skilled Craft
Worker.' 9 At that time, no women occupied any of the 238 Skilled
Craft Worker positions,2 nor had the Agency ever employed a woman
as a road dispatcher.' Twelve County employees applied for the
22
promotion, among them Diane Joyce and petitioner, Paul Johnson.
Nine applicants, deemed qualified for the position, subsequently were
interviewed by a two person board and given a score.Y Seven applicants scored above 70, which meant they were eligible for se-

12. Id. at 621. While women constituted 36.4qo of the County's labor market, only
22.4% comprised Agency employees. Moreover, women occupied these Agency positions in
areas traditionally held by women. Id.
Women comprised 76% of Office and Clerical Workers, but only 7.1% of the Agency
Officials and Administrators, and 8.6% of the Professionals. Id.
13. Id.See supra note 12.
14. Id. See Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (1984) where
the author notes that over fifty
percent of all adult women are in the paid labor force; that
half of all women workers are employed in segregated occupations that are over seventy
percent female; and that women comprise less than ten percent of all skilled workers. Id.
at 89, citing Sex Discriminationin the Workplace, 1981: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1981) at 16-23 (statement of
Joan Goodin, Executive Director. Nat'l Comm. on Working Women).
15. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621-22.
16. Id.at 622.
17. Id.
18. Id.at 623.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 621. The Agency Plan had recognized that women were most egregiously
underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category since no woman held a position in 238
of those positions. Id.
21. Id.at 624.
22. Id. at 623.
23. Id.
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lection.24 Scores ranged from 70 to 80.21 Johnson tied for second
with a score of 75, and Joyce ranked next with a score of 73.26

The appointing authority certified these applicants as eligible for
selection, and a second interview with three Agency supervisors
followed. 2 7 After two interviews by separate Agency panels 2 and
recommendation of the Affirmative Action Coordinator, ' 9 the Director of the Agency concluded that promotion should be given to
Joyce.3 0
Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),31 received a right-to-sue letter on
March 10, 1981,32 and filed suit in federal district court.33 The district
court found Johnson to be more qualified for the dispatcher position
than Joyce 4 and that the sex of Joyce was the determining factor
in her selection." Holding the Agency plan invalid, the court found
the evidence did not satisfy Weber's criterion that the plan be
3 6 The court then held the Agency Plan violated Title
temporary.
37
VII

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court and held that the Agency's consideration of Joyce's gender
was lawful.3" The court found that the absence of a specific ter-

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 624.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 625. The Agency Director testified that in making his determination he looked
at the overall picture in light of job qualifications, expertise, background, and affirmative
action considerations. Id.
31. Id. Section 705(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 253, creates the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, whose members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
Section 705(g) provides that "[tihe Commission shall have power(3) to furnish to persons subject to this title such technical assistance as they may request
to. further their compliance with this title or an order issued thereunder."
32. See supra note 4. Sections 2000e-5(e) and (f) concern the power of the EEOC to
enforce unlawful employment practices.
Section 2000e-5(e) states that a charge under this section shall be filed within 180 days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice. If the Commission has not filed a civil action
or entered into a conciliation agreement to which the aggrieved person is a party within 180
days from the filing of such a charge, section 2000e-5(f) provides that "the Commission
* . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such
notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by
the person claiming to be aggrieved ....
"
33. 480 U.S. at 625. On March 20, 1981, Johnson filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 748 F.2d 1308 (1984); modified,
770 F.2d 752 (1985).
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mination date for the Plan was not dispositive of temporariness
since the Plan's objective was attainment rather than maintenance
of a work force mirroring the labor force in the County. 9 Applying
the Weber test, 40 the court specifically decided that the Agency
adopted the Plan in order to address a conspicuous imbalance in
the Agency's work force4' and that the Plan neither unnecessarily
trammeled the rights of other employees nor created an absolute
bar to their advancement.4 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed
the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals., 3 The Supreme
Court held that the Agency appropriately considered the sex of Diane
Joyce as an element in determining that she should be promoted to
the road dispatcher position." In concluding, the Court stated that
the employment decision made pursuant to an affirmative action
plan represented a moderate, flexible, case by case approach to
effecting a gradual
representation of minorities and women in the
45
work force.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Historical Overview of the Court's Title VII Analyses
In determining whether an affirmative action plan complies with
Title VII, the Supreme Court traditionally begins by re-examining
Congressional intent associated with the statute.4 Next, assessment
of the legality of the plan is guided by factors that have arisen in
previous disputes, for example, voluntary compliance, temporariness
of a plan, and statistical references.4 7 These factors create the building
blocks which provide guidance for implementing a valid affirmative
action program.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1320.
See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
748 F.2d at 1313-14.
Id.
480 U.S. 616.
Id. at 641-42.

45.

Id. at 642.

46. See infra.
47. See generally United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding
that Title Vll's prohibition against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans); see also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In a 7-2 decision, with Justices Marshall and
Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
stated that statistical comparisons between an employer's work force and the area labor
market provided a standard from which prior discrimination could be inferred. Id. at 340
n.20.
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1. Title VII and Congressional Purpose
Enacted as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII provided
for elimination of discrimination in the workplace." The central
statutory purpose manifested by Congress was to eradicate discrimination throughout the economy and to afford a remedy to those
persons injured through past discrimination. 49 To implement Title
VII, Congress created the EEOC as a federal agency to provide
technical assistance and to oversee compliance with Title VIIVO To
carry out these regulations, affirmative action plans became the
appropriate means employed."
In implementing an affirmative action plan, an employer may
utilize statistics, 2 and consider race53 and now gender,) to remedy
past discrimination in the workplace. Although these factors do not
describe the full range of possible evidentiary showings in an affirmative action plan, they propose a set of guidelines. Ideally,
affirmative action plans, without using quotas or violating merit
selection procedures, are the most practical and flexible way for
employers to eradicate the effects of past discrimination and not
infringe upon any significant interest of nonminority employees."

48. See supra note 4. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
In Albemarle the Court stated that it was the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole
for injuries resulting from unlawful employment discrimination. The Albemarle Court stated
that "Title VII deals with legal injuries of an economic character occasioned by racial or
other antiminority discrimination." Id. at 418.
49. Albemarle Paper Co. at 413-22.
50. See supra notes 31 and 32.
51. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1608.12 (1985). See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974). Although Alexander primarily involved an employer's statutory right to a de novo
trial under Title VII irrespective of prior submission of his claim to final arbitration, the
Court further illuminated the purposes and goals of Title VII. In an unanimous opinion,
Justice Powell stated for the Court that in order to effectuate the goal of Title VII, the
Court had determined that cooperation and voluntary compliance were the preferred means
for achieving that goal. Id. at 44. The Court noted that Title VII does not concern "majoritarian
processes," but rather, an individual's right to equal employment opportunities. Id. at 51.
52. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Justice Blackmun emphasized in his concurring opinion
that a preferential hiring plan attempting to remedy a traditional statistical imbalance was
consistent with Title VII. Id. at 213-14. See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), where the
Court found that where statistical evidence was offered to show racial or ethnic imbalance
as probative of purposeful discrimination, and not to support an erroneous theory that Title
VII required the employer's work force to be racially balanced, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(j)
did not preclude use of such evidence. Id. at 339-40 n.20.
53. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
54. Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). See Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Johnson, 480 U.S.
616 (No. 85-1129) which states that "[tihe remedy chosen here was to consider female gender
as an additional positive factor in the promotion process. This is similar to the remedy
approved in Bakke, wherein this Court held that race could be used as a positive factor to
be considered in school admissions process."
55. Amicus Curiae Brief of the National League of Cities, National Association of
Counties, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and International City Management Association in
support of Respondent, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-1129).
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2. Judicial Interpretation of Congressional Intent Concerning
Title VII Enactment

The United States Supreme Court first explored the meaning of

Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.5 6 The Griggs Court declared,
"What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate

invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." ' 7 Additionally, the objective of the statute
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that operated to favor an identifiable group."
As to the preferred means of achieving Title VII's objectives,
Congress intended that employers voluntarily comply. 9 Johnson remains consistent with that analysis.6 Sharing this view, the EEOC
promulgated guidelines with the understanding that Title VII encouraged employers to act on a voluntary basis. 6' These guidelines
state that "voluntary affirmative action to improve opportunities
for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in
order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII. ,,62

As support for its analysis of Title VII's legislative intent, Johnson
recognized that Congress had not amended the statute to reject
judicial constructions. 63 Since no amendments have been proposed,
the Court assumed their interpretation was correct. 64 Specifically,
Johnson found Congressional reaction probative since Congress had
not hesitated to amend the statute if displeased with judicial interpretation of Title VII.65 Thus, based on an interpretation of Title

56. 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971). "In Griggs. v. Duke Power Co., and again in Albemarle
the Court noted that a primary objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal
employment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male
employees over other employees." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364.
57. Griggs, 401 at 431; see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
58. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. See also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutzaick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
59. Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). See also supra note 51.
60. 480 U.S. at 630. Justice Brennan states that " 'Congress' concern that federal courts
not impose unwanted obligations on employers and unions,' [citation omitted] reflects a desire
to preserve a relatively large domain for voluntary employer action." Id. at 631 n.8 (quoting
Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 524).
61. Firefighters, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). With respect to EEOC interpretations, in his
concurrence, Justice Stevens states these interpretations are entitled to great deference. Johnson,
480 U.S. at 643 n.2. See supra notes 29-30.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1985).
63. 480 U.S. at 629-30 n.7.
64. Id. The majority states that "[any belief in the notion of a dialogue between the
judiciary and the legislature must acknowledge that on occasion an invitation declined is as
significant as one accepted." Id. at 630 n.7.
This notion is not foreign to the Court. In Weber Justice Blackmun stated in his concurrence
that "if the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the
question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses." 443 U.S. at 216.
65. 480 U.S. at 629-31 nn.7-8.
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VII's Congressional intent, the Court concluded that legislative history indicated Congress' clear intention that employers play a major

role in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination.6

3. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber and the Current
Affirmative Action Analysis
With United Steelworkers of America v. Webe, 67 the Supreme
Court further elaborated on its prior legislative history analyses of
Title VII. The Court articulated three primary guidelines to assist

the Court in interpreting subsequent affirmative action disputes, such
as that demonstrated by the Johnson case.6 First, the prohibition

against discrimination in Section 703(a)69 "must be read against the
background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical
context from which the Act arose." 70 Second, Congress' concern
was addressed primarily to the problem of opening opportunities in
occupations which traditionally have been closed to specific groups. 7'
The Court likened the statutory words to a catalyst which causes
employers to self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate discrimination.72 Lastly, the Court
observed that nothing contained in Title VII required an employer
to grant preferential treatment to any group. 73 The Court drew the
inference that Congress chose not to forbid voluntary affirmative
action because the statutory language of Section 703(j) indicated
4
Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom.7

66. Id. at 628-30.
67. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
68. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627.
69. See supra note 4.
70. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892), in which the Court stated that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Id. at 459.
71. Weber, 443 U.S. at 203.
72. Id. at 204.
73. Id. at 205. At the time of enactment, opponents of Title VII argued that the Act
would be interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work forces to grant
preferential treatment to racial minorities in order to integrate. Id. To allay any fears, Congress
addressed the issue in Section 703(j) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(j)
and provided that:
[niothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer
• . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual . . . because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer . . . in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race
. . . sex . . . or national origin in any community . . . or in the available
work force in any community.
However, the Court notes that Section 7030) does not preclude courts from considering
racial imbalance as evidence of a Title VII violation. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
n.20 (1977). Justice Brennan noted in Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986) that in some instances an employer's racist recalcitrance will be of such proportion
that the only effective way to ensure enjoyment of the rights protected by Title VII is to
require the employer to take affirmative steps to end discrimination. Id. at 448-49.
74. Weber, 443 U.S. at 206-07.
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Weber established a standard against which the Court evaluated
the Johnson case. Because the Court found it unnecessary to demarcate between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans, the Weber decision does not articulate a dispositive test.
Instead, the Court will look to the general purposes of the affirmative
action plan and determine whether those purposes mirror those of
Title VII. The inquiry involves four factors: 1) whether the plan's
design breaks down old patterns of segregation; 7" 2) whether the
plan's structure opens employment traditionally closed to certain
groups in occupations traditionally closed to them; 76 3) whether the
plan unnecessarily trammels the interests of other employees and
creates a bar to their advancement;" and lastly, 4) whether the plan
represents an intention to eliminate a manifest imbalance.78
The Court expanded Weber's holding in Johnson.79 The cases
together define the current framework of Title VII 0 and provide a
foundation for subsequent Title VII issues which may arise.
B. The Johnson Decision
In reviewing the employment decision at issue in Johnson, the
United States Supreme Court examined two questions.8" First, was
the decision made pursuant to a plan similar to the concerns of the
employer in Weber?8 2 Weber focused on the disparity between the
percentage of black skilled workers in the employer's ranks and the
percentage of blacks in the area labor force. Second, was the effect
of the plan in Johnson comparable to the effect of the plan in
Weber? 3 At the outset, the Court stated that the decision in Weber
would guide the Court's assessment of the legality of the Agency
Plan in Johnson.8"
1.Manifest Imbalance
At issue in Johnson is whether consideration of the gender of
applicants was justified by the existence of a "manifest imbalance" 5

75. Id. at 208.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. An employer need point only to an obvious imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.
79. 480 U.S. 616.
80. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197. The concerns in Weber parallel those in Johnson. Weber
involved an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances.
Although only 1.83% of skilled workers were black, approximately 39% of the area work
force was black. Consequently, the plan reserved for black employees 50% of the openings
in newly created in-plant training programs. Id.
81. 480 U.S. at 631.
82. Id. See supra note 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 627.
85. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
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that reflected underrepresentation of women in "traditionally segregated job categories."" In order to determine whether an imbalance
exists that would justify taking gender into account, the Court
formulated two types of comparisons, depending upon the kind of
job in dispute. If the job requires no special expertise, then a
comparison of the percentage of women in the employer's work
force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population is appropriate.8 7 Where a job requires special training, the
comparison should be with those in the labor force who possess the
relevant qualifications.8 8 The parties in Johnson fall into the latter
category. 89 The Plan authorized consideration of affirmative action
concerns when evaluating qualified applicants.*
Where an employee wishes to challenge an affirmative action
program, two avenues are available, depending on whether the employee makes a constitutional challenge or a challenge pursuant to
the constraints of Title VII. At the first level, the employee has the
burden of demonstrating the legality of the affirmative action program. 9' When race or sex are taken into account in an employer's
employment decision, a prima facie standard is applied. 92 The burden
then shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale
for the decision. 9' Existence of an affirmative action program provides
such a rationale. 94 The burden then shifts back to the employee to
prove the employer's justification was pretextual, thereby making
the plan invalid. 9
The Court cautions, however, that it does not regard as identical
the constraints of Title VII and the Constitution on voluntary affirmative action plans. 96 Johnson finds application of the prima facie
standard inconsistent with Weber,97 and therefore applies a broader
measurement, that of a manifest imbalance. 9
Showing a manifest imbalance is a less stringent standard than
that required to support a prima facie case against an employer. 99

86. Id.
87. Id. The Court cites Weber, 443 U.S. 193, and Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, in support
of this proposition.
88. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 635. In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977), the Court determined that in ascertaining underrepresentation in teaching positions,
the employer school district had to compare the percentage of blacks in the employer's ranks
with the percentage of qualified black teachers in the area labor market.
89. 480 U.S. at 633-37.
90. Id. at 637.
91. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
92. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 632.
97. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
98. 480 U.S. at 632.
99. A three-part analysis applies to disparate impact claims. In order to establish a prima
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The prima facie standard would have required the employer in
Johnson to compare the percentage of women qualified for the job
in its work force with the percentage of women qualified workers
in the area labor market.100 The Court notes that Weber "obviously
did not make such a comparison"' 0'1 and that the prima facie standard
would have invalidated Weber. 1°2
The manifest imbalance standard, however, permits comparison
with the general labor force. Although not stated in terms of policy,
but appearing to have that effect, the Court states that application
of a prima facie standard in Title VII cases would be inconsistent
with Weber s focus on statistical imbalance. 03 This, the Court says,
"could inappropriately create a significant disincentive for employers
to adopt an affirmative action plan."0 4 Even where the disparity
is not so striking, the manifest imbalance standard permits an employer to adopt a plan without having to introduce non-statistical
evidence of past discrimination that the prima facie standard would
require.10 5 As long as an agency undertakes a plan designed to
eliminate work force imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, a manifest imbalance standard applies. That mode of analysis, therefore, remains consistent with the Weber and Johnson
Courts.
2. Unnecessarily Trammel Rights or Create Absolute Bar
Johnson's second level of inquiry involves the rights of employees
who are not members of the underrepresented class. The issue is
whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily trammels the rights of male
employees or creates a bar to their advancement. t 6 The facts of the
case govern.
The Agency Plan acknowledged limited opportunities for women
in the past in areas where women had not been traditionally em-

fade case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show: 1) that the plaintiff belongs to a minority;
2) that he or she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; and 3) that despite the plaintiff's qualifications, plaintiff was rejected. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
By utilizing this three-part analysis in disparate impact claims, the Court notes that "Title
VII guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white
workers on the basis of job-related criteria." Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982).
100. 480 U.S. at 632-34. The Court notes that because of the employment issue in Johnson
the discussion refers primarily to the Plan's provisions to remedy the underrepresentation of
women. The Court takes care to note that its analysis of the provisions in the Plan could
pertain to minorities as well. Id. at 635-36 n.13.
101. 480 U.S. at 633 n.10.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 632-33.
104. Id. at 633.
105. Id. at 633 n.l0.
106. Id. at 637-38.
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ployed.10 7 Quotas were not set, nor was blind hiring authorized."
No persons were automatically excluded from consideration.' 9 The
Plan's goal was to attain a balanced work force, not maintain one." 0
With these factors, the Court rejected petitioner's contention that
he was entitled to the job.
Johnson stressed that petitioner had no absolute entitlement to
the job since seven applicants for the position qualified as eligible.,"
In addition, promotion was not a legitimate firmly rooted expectation. 2 Finally, Johnson retained employment with the Agency at
the same salary and seniority and remained eligible for other promotions.'3
The Plan merely provided that when the employer evaluated qualified applicants, consideration should be given to affirmative action
concerns. Gender was but one of the criteria influencing affirmative
action concerns. Since gender was only a factor to consider in order
to attain rather than maintain a balanced work force, Johnson
concluded that the rights of other employees were not unnecessarily
4
affected by the Plan, nor did the Plan bar their advancement."
C. Effect of the Johnson Decision
While Johnson marks the first affirmative action case to recognize
gender under the aegis of Title VII, the effects of the decision are
far-reaching not only for women but for minorities as well. This is
of. significant import in a multi-cultural state such as New Mexico.
The Johnson decision condones a public employer's voluntary affirmative action plan which takes into account the number of women
in an employer's work force compared to women represented in the
area labor market for jobs that require no special expertise, and
for jobs requiring special training, a comparison of women in the
labor force who possess the relevant qualifications. An employer

107. Id. at 634-35. But see Justice Scalia's dissent wherein he blames women and longstanding social attitudes as the culprits behind limited opportunities for women in areas where
they have not traditionally been employed. He finds that these areas have not been regarded
by women themselves as desirable work, and therefore, the Agency cannot be found to have
systematically excluded women from employment on road crews. Id. at 668.
It appears, however, that the Court may have rejected this manner of reasoning when it
stated, "[i]n the usual case, the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women
may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the
individual woman to make that choice for herself." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
335 (1977).
108. 480 U.S. at 635-36.
109. Id. at 637-40.
110. Id. at 640.
111. Id. at 638.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Court has previously noted that denial of future employment opportunities
is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267.
114. 480 U.S. at 639.
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may use this measurement in order to attain a balanced work force
and not violate the spirit and legislative intent of Title VII.
Congressional desire to read broadly the Civil Rights Act of 1964
remains evident. Three days short of the year marking the Johnson
decision, the Senate overrode a Presidential veto by a 2/3 majority
73-24 vote," 5 in the Civil Rights Restoration Act, a bill intended
"to restore the broad scope of coverage and to clarify the application
of. . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964."116 Although the bill concerned
four other civil rights statutes, those pertaining to education, rehabilitation, and age discrimination," 7 the record exemplified the
strong policy favoring broad interpretation of the Act." 8
Both of New Mexico's senators strongly stated their support. "For
too long, discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, and physical
handicap has been a blight on this country. So long as people in
America are subjected to these types of discrimination, we are not
a free people."" 9 "The intent of Congress always has been, and
must continue to be, that the broadest interpretation be given to
statutory construction of our Federal civil rights laws."' 2 0 In light
of this commentary it is significant to note that Title VII's legislative
history demonstrates that Title VII was intended to "cover . . . all
Americans."' 2' These words evince a strong Congressional intent to
eliminate discrimination in the workplace.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority in Johnson attempts to abolish sexual discrimination
in the workplace. The Court announces its objective is to remedy
past discrimination through a case-by-case analysis which affords an
employer flexibility and freedom from undue federal involvement.
The import of Johnson is that an employer can exhibit preferential
hiring towards women and minorities in order to eliminate work
force imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories as long
as the employer's affirmative action goal is to attain a balanced
work force rather than maintain one. The Supreme Court has already
demonstrated that Johnson was not an ad hoc decision whose determination rested exclusively on the facts in its case.1'2 Johnson

115. S. 557, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 36, 2730 (1988).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2751 (statement of Senator Domenici).
120. Id. at 2756 (statement of Senator Bingaman).
121. 110 CONG. REc. 2578 (1964).
122. See Corporate City of South Bend v. Janowiak, 481 U.S. 1001 (1987), vacating 750
F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984). On a petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for further
consideration in light of Johnson. The case was appealed after remand, 836 F.2d 1034 (7th
Cir. 1988), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari thereafter, 109 S. Ct. 1310 (1988).

232

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

exhibits the extent to which the Court has permitted affirmative
action law to evolve.
SOPHIA S. COLLAROS

